Evolutionary aesthetics attempts to explain the human ability to perceive objects, conspecifics and the surrounding environment in an aes thetic manner -i.e. in an emotional and evaluative way resulting in a positive or negative appraisal -by referring to the evolutionary histo ry of our functional, cognitive make-up. Research has mostly focussed on aesthetic considerations made during landscape assessment and on the role of aesthetic elements during mate choice. Criticism has been expressed repeatedly as to the naturalistic, presumed to be reductionist methods and outlook of an evolutionary approach to aesthetics. This paper briefly reviews the outline of evolutionary aesthetics research and discusses three such critiques -functionality in beauty judgement, reductionism, and the recognition of cultural and interindividual differences. It argues that philosophical aesthetics is not in danger of being unjustly reduced to a neurobiological explanation of aesthetic judgement and experience, and that evolutionary and traditional humanities approaches can be complementary in understanding our sense of beauty.
Introduction
In 1973, the evolutionary biologist Theodosius Dobzhansky uttered the now famous phrase that "nothing in biology makes sense except in the light of evolution." In recent decades, humanities departments worldwide have similarly recognized the importance of evolutionary theory and its many applications for understanding human nature and its cultural products. While presumably less rigorous than evolutionary theory's steady presence in biology departmentsfew humanities scholars will argue that their subjects do not make sense at all when approached from more familiar disciplinary perspectives such as history and philosophy -bio-evolutionary approaches are nonetheless becoming increasingly prevalent in departments that represent some of the most remarkable cultural exponents of human nature.
Yet the advent of evolutionary biology and its related fields has not been unnoticed, and has often been met with significant controversy. Critics tend to focus heavily on the assumption that considering features of biological evolution is a strongly reductionist method, devaluing elements such as cultural signifi cance and semantics. Such critiques are, however, more often than not a reflection of disciplinary conservatism, sparked by insufficient insight into the theoretical structure and explanatory intent of evolutionary theory. This paper addresses the common hostility within humanities departments with regard to biological theorization concerning their subjects by discussing the emergence of evolutionary aesthetics. After briefly sketching the aims and methods of this discipline, it mentions three concerns that have been expressed with regard to evolutionary aesthetics' methods, aims and findings: research in this field is said to be at odds with predominantly Kantian thought in western philosophical aes thetics, it is critized for being overly reductionist because of its naturalistic out look, and finally, it is supposedly unable to account for interindividual differences in aesthetic preference.
Evolutionary aesthetics: the story of an emerging paradigm
Historically, the emergence of evolutionary aesthetics almost coincides with the formulation of Darwinian evolutionary theory in On the Origin o f Species in 1859. In the mid 19th century, the philosopher and scientist Herbert Spencer already hypothesized that art and aesthetics might have emerged from other, functional behaviours related to survival and reproduction (Aiken, 1999) . Im portant foundations of the discipline were also laid down in the experimental psychological research of Gustav Theodor Fechner, who developed an empirical, bottom-up perspective to aesthetics. His perspective attempted to discover 'laws of liking', focussing on finding objective properties involved in aesthetic judge-ment, rather than a definition of beauty, or the normative implications of such judgements (Allesch, 2001 ).
Methodologically, evolutionary aesthetics is firmly rooted in the discipline of evolutionary psychology.1 Researchers in this field argue that the mental structures and operations characteristic of a species, such as humans, have arisen according to evolutionary processes that are similar, if not the same, than in biological evolution. During the Pleistocene epoch, spanning the majority of the evolutionary history of the human lineage, ancestral humans were confronted with a variety of adaptive problems, ranging from having to find and secure suitable mates, determine whether a new environment was suitable to spend more time in, map social interactions, assess cooperative and cheater intent in conspecifics, avoid ingesting harmful substances and provide adequate infant care.
These problems created selection pressures which eventually resulted in func tional psychological machinery designed to address them. Human nature can, according to many evolutionary psychologists, be regarded as an evolved, species-typical collection of such mechanisms (e.g. Symons, 1992; Thornhill, 2003) .
Generally, evolutionary aesthetics researchers propose that the human aes thetic sense -our ability to express negative or positive evaluative judgement of the surrounding environment -reflects such innate cognitive machinery that evolved for a functional purpose (Thornhill, 2003) . This function is best understood by referring to evolutionary psychology's general explanation for the evolution of emotions. Emotions are thought to have evolved as motivational systems for directing behaviour. A particular emotional experience by an individual is the eventual outcome of an evolved system of neural rewards and punishments (Orians, 2001; Thornhill, 2003) . Throughout evolutionary history, elements in the environment that were beneficial for survival and reproductive purposes were endowed with favourable neural response following sensory perception by an individual, whereas elements that were potentially harmful resulted in neural and thus emotional responses that motivated the individual concerned to remove itself from the threat (Pinker, 1997) . One of the most fundamental emotional responses is the experience of beauty -where favourable conditions are present -and ugliness as its reverse -when environmental stimuli are perceived as harmful or threatening. Thornhill has concisely summarized this point as follows: "Beauty experiences are unconsciously realized avenues to high fitness in human evolutionary history. Ugliness defines just the reverse." (Thornhill, 2003: 9) . Wilson similarly stated that human aesthetic propensities "play upon the circuitry of the brain's limbic system in a way that ultimately promotes survival and reproduction." (Wilson, 1984: 61) .
The element of functionality with regard to environmental perception and affective experience is a recurring feature. Ruso and colleagues write that "hu man evolutionary aesthetics is in many ways the study of humble everyday lifepreferences and feelings evoked by a stimulus without self-conscious thought, and yet prevalent on an almost daily basis." (Ruso, 2003: 279) . Kaplan similarly states that "aesthetics in this perspective is a functionally based way of responding to the environment." (Kaplan, 1992: 585) Such definitions make abundantly clear that research in evolutionary aesthetics inevitably involves a joint examination of cognition and emotion. Gazzaniga concisely summarized this as follows:
"Aesthetics is a special class of experience, neither a type of response nor an emotion, but a modus operandi of "knowing about" the world. It is a sensation with an attached positive or negative evaluation." (Gazzaniga, 2009: 208) .
Within evolutionary aesthetics, interest has focussed on two main subjects: aesthetic considerations made during mate choice, and evaluating habitats in terms of their suitability for prolonged occupation, often summarized under the subfield of environmental aesthetics. In both cases, immediately perceivable characteristics of an environment -including conspecifics present in it -can be indicators of more fundamental properties that may or may not be fitnessenhancing. Researchers in evolutionary aesthetics have tended to focus almost exclusively on the importance of visual perception, which explains why the vast majority of available theoretical and empirical studies also investigates this sen sory modality.2
Researchers in environmental aesthetics are interested in uncovering which environments as a whole, or which particular features elicit favourable responses in observers, assuming that such positive appraisals are the product of evolved cognition, indicative of selection pressures during the Pleistocene. Three main hypotheses have dominated this field of research. In the savanna hypothesis, Heerwagen (1992, 1993) propose that the significant part of human Prehistory that was spent in the savanna environment of Eastern Africa is still reflected in current aesthetic preferences for landscape features. They describe the most essential human needs, at least during the Pleistocene, as having "to find adequate food and water and to protect themselves from the physical environment, predators, and hostile conspecifics." (1993: 140-141) Savanna environments are well suited for fulfilling these needs, as they often contain features like large trees, plant growth, water, focal points in semi-open spaces with changes in elevation and relatively unobstructed views of the horizon, which would have enabled a clear view of risks and opportunities in the immediate surroundings, as well as providing a degree of protection against possible harm (Orians 1980) . Another notable hypothesis in the field is the prospect-refuge theory (Appleton 1975) . It predicts that humans should seek out environments that provide a maximal balance of prospect -environmental features that enable, for example, spotting resources from a distance -and refuge -shelter opportunities in view of potential danger. Finally, Kaplan (1989 Kaplan ( , 1992 developed an information gathering model of environmental aesthetics, addressing the basic need to be able to extract relevant information from the surrounding environment while at the same time avoiding the risks that accompany treading in unknown territories. Based on a matrix of structural properties of an environment, such as coherence, complexity, legibility and mystery, it is argued that by assessing these properties, one should be able to understand an environment, as well as determine its exploratory potential.
Several features of these hypotheses have been tested empirically. In an analysis of recurrent features in western landscape painting and garden architecture, Orians and Heerwagen (1993) found preferences that are strongly consistent with the predictions made by the savanna hypothesis. In addition, they found that prospect-refuge imagery is related to the time of day depicted in a particular painting, with a stronger emphasis on refuge elements present when the scene was set during dusk or nightfall. Additionally, recent research has assessed the abovementioned and other findings from environmental aesthetics in contemporary contexts and in an applied manner, such as the role of nature imagery in advertising (Hartmann & Apaolaza-Ibanez 2010) , and psychophysiological and behavioural effects of exposure to natural stimuli (e.g. Bringslimark, Hartig & Patil, 2011 , Donovan & Prestemon, 2010 , Nielsen & Hansen, 2007 .
The second main interest in evolutionary aesthetics is the process of sexual selection, and in particular the role of aesthetic considerations during courtship display and mate choice. Observations across a wide range of species yield numerous examples of sexually dimorphic traits, or phenotypic characteristics that differ between male and female organisms within a species. In practice, the males of a species are often the ones that possess complex, costly traits that appear paradoxical and even harmful from a survival perspective, but can relatively easily be explained as products of sexual selection (Miller, 2001) .3
Two general frameworks have been proposed to account for the evolution of signalling traits as well as discriminatory abilities for assessing these traits (Bar ber, 1995 , Miller, 2001 . Good genes sexual selection encompasses a variety of ideas such as the handicap principle (Zahavi, 1975) , parasite resistance theory (Hamilton & Zuk, 1982) and perceivable developmental stability as the outcome of immunocompetence (Gangestad, Thornhill & Yeo, 1994 , Thornhill & Gangestad, 1993 , Watson & Thornhill, 1994 . The general argument is that phenotypic traits, such as morphological properties of an organism, can be indicative of underlying genetic quality and overall health. Two frequently studied phenotypic features in this regard are symmetry and averageness. The absence of symmetry in human bodies and faces is often indicative of developmental normalcy, and therefore the absence of parasites, bacteria and viruses that might interfere with regular development (Gangestad, Thornhill & Yeo 1994) . Averageness, most clearly recognizable in facial anatomy, is linked to heterozygosity which in turn correlates with better immunocompetence (Thornhill & Gangestad, 1993 , Watson & Thornhill, 1994 .
A second possibility would be to explain phenotypic traits as the outcome of a process of runaway selection (Fisher, 1930) . Maintaining the gender bias of male display and female choice, this theory predicts that a preference arising in a female, in response to a male trait, can become caught in a feedback loop that
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The bias of display traits among males and choice by females is explained by T rivers' parental investment theory (1972), which states that females' greater investment in gestation and childcare predicts greater choosiness when selecting mating partners, as insufficient partners entail much greater reproductive costs than for males, whose investment is a lot smaller.
drives both the development of the trait in future generations of males, as well as the preference for this trait in female offspring.4 The original preference can be arbitrary, with no link between the trait and any underlying genetic quality or health, but runaway selection can also occur based on a pre-existing, functional preference such as the ones predicted by good genes sexual selection (Barber, 1995) . Naturally, such a feedback loop comes to an end and stabilizes both the trait and the preference once they become harmful to the organisms' survival chances.
Along the lines of evolutionary psychological thinking on emotions as motivational agents for behavioural choices (e.g. Orians, 2001) , evolutionary aesthetics research on mating generally proposes that aesthetic preferences for features such as symmetry and averageness of facial and bodily traits are in fact unconscious choices for health, developmental stability and good genes, as choices for these features result in higher-quality offspring, and thus would have gradually become endowed with neural rewards over the course of evolution. Since these are functional rather than arbitrary choices, the emphasis tends to be on good genes sexual selection.
In sum, research in evolutionary aesthetics can explain, through references to the evolution of adaptive neurocognitive mechanisms in mating and habitat contexts, why some structural properties appear to elicit neural reward and thus positive aesthetic appraisal in the form of beauty judgements. It then becomes possible to extent this research to art, or more specifically, to particular features that appear to be universally recurrent in terms of their aesthetic appeal. One way of doing so would be to map apparently universal aesthetic principles, such as symmetry, novelty and moderate complexity, and clarity (van Damme 1996) . Additionally, it is possible to extend the signalling interpretation of human aesthetic features to artefacts, such as experiencing these as beautiful by -unconsciouslyassessing the resources and time spent on their creation (Voland, 2003) .
Evolutionary and philosophical aesthetics: the scene of a heated debate
In a discussion of Nietzsche's biologically based aesthetics, Moore (2002) referring to the absence of any interest in the functionality of a perceived object.
A new impulse for naturalistic approaches to aesthetics, and eventually evolutionary aesthetics, did not arrive until the publication of Darwin's evolutionary theory in the mid 19th century (Moore, 2002) .5
Despite the presence of naturalistic views on aesthetics in the history of this still predominantly philosophical discipline, researchers in the field often reluctantly respond to the advent of contemporary scientific theories and methods, such as those from evolutionary biology and psychology. The predominance of
Kantian thought in philosophical aesthetics in particular seems to spark resistance against the evolutionary approach, as these two apparently conflict at various points. In the remainder of this paper, I will address three critiques sometimes uttered towards evolutionary aesthetics, and I will argue that evolutionary and more traditional approaches are not at odds, and even necessarily complementary. Content-wise, the focus will be on sexual selection related aesthetics rather than environmental aesthetics, as the former is predominant in current evolutionary aesthetics research.
Functionality and aesthetic judgement
In Wallace developed a similar trajectory of evolutionary thought to account for the origin and development of species, but differed notably in opinion when it came to the principles of sexual selection. When discussing ornamentation, he distinguished between ornaments present in all organisms of a species, and ornaments present only in males. The first category was described as being a means for species recognition, thus explaining them independent of the mechanism of sexual selection. Predominantly male ornaments in turn, Wallace thought, were non-functional side-effects of an animal physiology aimed at bright colours and sounds, only constrained by natural selection. The increasingly outspoken presence of such ornaments during mating seasons or rituals was explained as the outcome of a stored surplus of energy. Females supposedly did not possess such ornaments as they needed to be a lot more camouflaged around their vulnerable offspring (Miller, 2001) . Additionally, Wallace hypothesized that female choice was not actually based on aesthetic considerations, but rather on utilitarian motivations such as finding healthy partners. In addition to sexual selectionist theory, it is necessary to consider the emer gence of knowledge on genetics and inheritance. Unknown to Darwin, the basic rules of inheritance on a genetic level were established during his lifetime by the Czech friar and scientist Gregor Mendel, but it would take until the fourth and fifth decade of the twentieth century before these revolutionary paths of scientific discovery were joined together in what is now widely known as 'the modern synthesis' (e.g. Fisher, 1930 (Miller, 2001) .
O f course the option still remains that elaborate peacocks' tails evolved through runaway sexual selection, which can in principle act upon arbitrary, non-fitness related traits. In this case, it could be true that the female preference for such tails can be sustained after accidentally arising -such as in the case of a mutation -if the preference is not harmful, i.e. if it doesn't correspond to a property in a male organisms that is severaly disadvantageous for survival and reproductive purposes (O'Hear, 1997 ). Yet this possibility overlooks the body of research providing insight into the precise connections between male phenotypic traits and their overall reproductive quality, as is evident from the aforementioned research on, for example, immunocompetence theory (see Barber, 1995) .
Such research indicates that it is unlikely that costly preferences for equally costly traits would persist if they were not compensated by functional benefits.
Reductionism and the levels of explanation
In The Descent o f M an, Darwin acknowledged that a significant part of human aesthetic experience and judgement depends on elements of semantics, education and culture. While "man and many of the lower animals are alike pleased by the same colours, graceful shading and forms, and the same sounds," (1896: 93)
he also thought that "no animal would be capable of admiring such scenes as the heavens at night, a beautiful landscape, or refined music; but such high tastes are acquired through culture, and depend on complex associations; they are not As such -at least if Kantian aesthetics is taken as a default position -it appears that Darwin surpasses the importance of rationality in human aesthetic judgement, thus making his parallels with the non-human world of animals apparently illegitimate. In this sense, evolutionary aesthetics is thought to be reduc tionist because it unjustly parallels humans with sometimes very distant animal relatives. A way out of this can perhaps be found in Davies's compromise position on the phylogenetic roots of the aesthetic, i.e. the extent to which we share our ability to aesthetically appreciate the outside world with non-human species.
He rejects on the one hand the liberal position that all "pleasurable or unpleasurable perceptual experience" can be regarded as aesthetic, which would almost automatically equate that non-human animal aesthetic-like responses are the same as human ones (2012: 15).8 The other extreme take on aesthetic experience is the 18th century Enlightenment view, endorsed by Kant and others, which basically states that an aesthetic experience is contemplative, largely if not completely detached from utilitarian motivations, often directed towards the perception of formalist properties, and requiring a particular kind of interaction be tween imagination and understanding (Davies, 2012) .
According to Davies, neither of these two positions appears sufficient to ac count for both non-human animal aesthetic-like responses, as well as human aesthetic experience that has been commonly described in philosophical aesthet- is by studying aesthetic experience and judgement both in a cultural and phi losophical way -focussing on individual experience, semantic content, imagination, etc. -as well as with bio-evolutionary methods -analyzing the neurobiological structure of the ability to appreciate objects, other individuals and the surrounding environment in terms of beauty and ugliness.9
Cultural and interindividual differences in aesthetic preferences
An evolutionary approach to aesthetics suggests that the human ability to appreciate objects, physical environments and animate beings in terms of beauty or ugliness is a universal propensity. However, this does not mean that all cultures must have the same aesthetic preferences. In a parallel with language, Davies (2012) explains that while our capacity for language learning and speaking is very likely an adaptation, this doesn't necessarily imply that all people worldwide must speak the same language. Instead, "we should be looking for widespread consensus over at least some aesthetic assessments within a culture and the possibility of coming to understand the different aesthetic preferences of other groups." (2012: 48) Aside from such a consensus -which may be a set of basic, universal aesthetic principles10 -evolution thus also allows for cultural variation.
Cultural differences in aesthetic preference may in itself rely on an evolved propensity to seek variation. In The Descent o f M an, Darwin wrote: have also been found between a preference for neonate, softer traits in women's faces at times when the economy prospers, whereas opposite traits tend to be positively assessed during economic downfall (Pettijohn & Tesser, 1999 ). Another reason that applies more specifically to temporal changes in aesthetic preference can be the tendency of a society's elite to maintain their external signals of high status by adopting new and different signals if the previous ones become increasingly average and are adopted by the society as a whole (Cunningham & Shamblen, 2003) .
In attempting to understand how evolutionary aesthetics can explain interindividual differences, it is relevant to include neurocognitive research on this subject.11 By studying individuals' brains in a variety of conditions and with dif ferent sets of stimuli, it becomes possible to understand how such differences in aesthetic appreciation work on a neurobiological level, and consequentially, how they eventually become clear in aesthetic experience and judgement on a more conscious level. fMRI research by Kirk and colleagues (2009) with groups of architects and non-architects found that the level of expertise present influences the cognitive processing of relevant stimuli, in this case architectural creations, but also the amount of neural rewards evoked by these stimuli. This means that an individual more familiar with a particular kind of representations can experience heightened aesthetic responses. Such an effect may be due to the mechanism of neuroplasticity, which broadly refers to the brain's capacity to establish new neural connections following new experiences or the perception of repre sentations, while deleting old or less useful ones. In this manner, knowledge is again joint with emotion in order to produce aesthetic effects (Jacobsen, 2010) .
nl Concerning individual variation, it is important to note that the process of evolution through natural or sexual selection precisely takes such individual variation as a starting point. If there was no variation in a particular trait, for example the extent to which an organism is capable of assessing the reproductive quality of a conspecific in aesthetic terms, evolution could not act upon the trait to select more successful variations to maintain in future generations.
Conclusion
In this paper, I outlined the methodological apparatus and thematic focus of evolutionary aesthetics, describing how it presents the human ability to express evaluative emotional judgement in terms of beauty and ugliness as an evolved motivational mechanisms with functional underpinnings. Three important critiques of evolutionary aesthetics were addressed, only representing a limited set of questions that can be asked at the intersection of evolutionary and more traditional humanities approaches to this subject. I argued that comments such as the one made by O'Hear concerning the potential functional, rather than aesthetic motivation at play in female choice reflects a one-sided interpretation of original Darwinian aesthetics, losing its presumed validity in the light of fundamental additions to Darwinian thought such as the ones made in the extended synthesis.
Additionally, I pointed out that the often feared reductionist agenda of evolutionary aesthetics is valid in scientific terms, i.e. in trying to approach our ability for aesthetic judgement on a more fundamental, biological level. Finally, I provided suggestions in support of the idea that looking at the evolutionary foundations of our aesthetic sense does not equal stating that there is no room for cul tural or interindividual variation. In this regard, neurocognitive research may prove to be particularly enligthening for our understanding of aesthetic experience and judgement on multiple levels.
